“Energiewende” in Germania: costi ed effetti

 A little over a year since Germany's about-face on energy, it is time to weigh up the effects it has had. In May 2011, the Ethics Commission, appointed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the aftermath of Fukushima, “advised” a rapid abandonment of nuclear energy. Already in the Commission’s final report, however, attention was drawn to the possible economic consequences. Today it is time to reflect on these and to analyze the German energy turnaround. What consequences are there in  economic, social and geo-political terms? And also: Why is the  German photovoltaic miracle over?

In the autumn of 2010, Chancellor Angela Merkel and her Vice Chancellor Guido Westerwelle triumphantly announced their energy program: the abandonment of the energy program of the Red-Green government of Gerhard Schroeder and the continuation of the use of nuclear energy until 2036. Just five months after this announcement, the incident at Fukushima and the regional election (in which environmental issues monopolized the political discussion) forced a jackknife in policy. The German government backed down, it announced the abandonment of nuclear energy, as the Ethics Commission had suggested, and, today, Germany has already shut down some of the seventeen nuclear reactors. By 2022 the Federal Republic of Germany will completely abandon this energy source. Between the nuclear energy exit policy of Schröder and Fischer (Ausstieg I) and that of Merkel and Westerwelle (Ausstieg II) there is apparently no substantial difference. Ausstieg I in 2000 indicated that each reactor could remain active for up to thirty-two years. The former project included a possible and desirable (but not certain!) abandonment of nuclear energy in 2022. Ausstieg I was not, moreover, a real reform or rethinking of energy policy. There was no real program to replace the production from nuclear energy with other energy sources. This was not possible because, at the time, the ideological struggle between supporters and opponents of nuclear energy was very lively and this prevented a serious ideological and public discussion on the subject. The latter project (Ausstieg II) established 2022 (in some cases even 2021) as a firm date for the abandonment of nuclear power. This decision marked a difference to the previous government in that it put an end to the ideological war between supporters and opponents of nuclear energy. In Germany, at the time the government took this decision, the majority of citizens were in favor. They were conditioned, of course, by the images of Fukushima to such an extent that many analysts have come to argue, rightly, that, apart from Japan, the major effects of the Japanese earthquake were, paradoxically, in Germany.

Now, the Merkel government’s decision to change its energy policy, which was taken during the very long night between 29 and 30 May 2011, determined the final end of nuclear power by 2022, the achievement by 2020 of energy production from renewable sources equal to 35 per cent and the reduction of CO2 emissions. In this sense Ausstieg II, compared to Ausstieg I, is an attempt to reform the energy policy of Germany. Angela Merkel has presented this program as a challenge to the international community but also as a great opportunity for future generations. This decision, apart from the fact that it disturbed some allies of the ruling coalition, was not appreciated by some neighboring countries, first of all France, which has criticized Germany’s choice. As we will see  Angela Merkel and her government’s about-turn on energy is now anything but a success.

In order to understand where and why Germany’s about-turn has stalled, we need to see which nuclear reactors were shut down last year and which are still active. [...]

In conclusion: making laws is relatively easy. Building electricity grids and wind farms is much more difficult. Planning an energy policy in the medium to long term is extremely complex and difficult. Today, Germany is paying for the hasty decisions of the past. Between 2000 and 2011 the Berlin government  changed its energy policy three times: first deciding to give up nuclear energy, then to invest in nuclear power and last year, again, to abandon it. In a federal country like Germany, as noted by Jasper von Altenbockum in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (16.3.2012), the result has been that each state of the Federal Republic of Germany has been working on its own energy program. In Germany chaos appears to reign and the result is that the Germans, according to a survey by the Allensbach-Institut, are losing interest in Energiewende. In the summer of last year, Karsten Polke-Majewski in Zeit (06.30.2011), commented, enthusiastically supporting the abandonment of nuclear power, that Germany was undertaking a great experiment: one of the leading world economies was trying to do without the atom. Today, perhaps we can not say categorically that that experiment has  failed, but certainly the costs are now excessive and it remains to be seen how successful the experiment will be. (L'intero articolo è possibile leggerlo sul numero 17 della rivista Longitude.)

Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli